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Abstract
Orthodox semantics for natural language modals give rise to two puzzles
for their interactions with disjunction: Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free
choice permission. It is widely assumed that each puzzle can be explained in
terms of the licensing of ‘Diversity’ inferences: from the truth of a possibility
or necessity modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each
disjunct is compatible with the relevant set of worlds. I argue that Diversity
inferences are too weak to explain the full range of data. Instead, I argue,
modals with embedded disjunctions license ‘Independence’ inferences: from
the truth of a modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each
disjunct is an independent alternative among the relevant set of worlds. I
then develop a bilateral inquisitive semantics for modals that predicts the
validity of these Independence inferences. My account vindicates common
intuitions about both Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission,
and explains the full range of data.
1 Introduction
Orthodox semantic theories of natural language modals make the seemingly cor-
rect prediction that we can make true, underspecific statements about what is
necessary or possible.1 For example, if it is necessary that I mail the letter
overnight, orthodox theories predict that my utterance of ‘I ought to mail the
letter’ is true, even though this sentence is not fully specific about what I have to
do. When combined with the standard theory of disjunction, however, this ap-
parently correct prediction gives rise to two well-known puzzles.2 First, there is
1By ‘orthodox’, I mean any theory that makes necessity and possibility modals upward
monotonic, e.g. the standard Kripke semantics that uses accessibility relations, and the context-
sensitive semantics of Kratzer (2012b). ‘Underspecific’ has many different uses in the philosophy
of language; the one I employ here has precedent in Zimmermann (2006) and Fara (2013).
2By ‘standard theory of disjunction’, I mean especially theories like that of Partee and Rooth
(1983), where disjunction is treated as the Boolean dual of conjunction.
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Ross’s Puzzle (Ross, 1941), which is the puzzle of reconciling the fact that orthodox
semantic theories predict the following inference to be valid with the appearance
that it is invalid:3
(1) a. Alicia ought to mail the letter. lM
b. So, Alicia ought to either mail the letter or burn it. lpM_ Bq
I will call an inference that exhibits the pattern in (1) a Ross inference.
Second, there is the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission (von Wright, 1968; Kamp,
1973). Here, the challenge is to reconcile the apparent validity of the following
inference with the fact that orthodox theories predict it to be invalid:
(2) a. Alicia may either mail the letter or burn it. ♦pM_ Bq
b. So, Alicia may burn the letter. ♦B
I will call an inference that exhibits the pattern in (2) a free choice inference.
There have been two kinds of solution to the puzzles. Pragmatic accounts
defend the semantic predictions of the orthodox theories and give a pragmatic
explanation of the apparent (in)validity in each case. Semantic accounts, by con-
trast, reject orthodoxy in favor of revisionary semantics for modals and/or dis-
junction in order to vindicate the appearance of (in)validity.
Both kinds of solution must explain why speakers’ intuitions about the (in)validity
of these arguments are in opposition to the predictions of the orthodox seman-
tics. Since a speaker’s judgment of the (in)validity of an argument depends on
what meanings the speaker assigns to the premises and the conclusion, provid-
ing such an explanation involves taking a stand on what speakers intuitively take
these sentences to mean. In fact, both semantic and pragmatic solutions to the
puzzles have typically agreed on this point: over and above their orthodox truth
conditions, sentences of the form ♦pp_ qq and lpp_ qq convey that p and q are
each compatible with the set of relevant worlds. In this paper, I argue that this
analysis cannot explain the full range of data. Instead, I argue that claims of the
form ♦pp _ qq and lpp _ qq convey something stronger: that p and q are each
independent alternatives among the set of relevant worlds. I then develop an orig-
inal revisionary semantics that validates these inferences, and thereby vindicates
our unorthodox intuitions about both puzzles.
The plan is as follows. In the next section (§2), I explain why orthodox se-
mantic theories make the counter-intuitive predictions that they do in our two
3In keeping with much of the recent literature, I use declarative ‘ought’ claims to illustrate
Ross’s puzzle. Ross’s original example was presented using imperatives: where ‘Post the letter!’
entails ‘Post the letter or burn it!’ Although I do not discuss imperatives in this paper, my account
can be straightforwardly extended to them.
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puzzles, and in §3, I survey a range of different modals for which the two puz-
zles arise. In §4, I argue that the puzzles need to be explained in terms of what
I call Independence inferences. In §5, I show that these inferences are validated
when a simple topological relationship — a minimal covering relation — holds
between the truth sets of the disjuncts and the set of relevant worlds over which a
modal quantifies. In §6, I use this relation to outline an inquisitive semantics for
modals that validates the Independence inferences, and I show how it vindicates
our intuitions in the two puzzles. Then, in §7, I extend the model to a ‘bilat-
eral’ version in order to generate better predictions for the interactions between
modals and negation. Finally, in §8, I show that the bilateral theory generates
some truth value gaps, and argue that these well-placed gaps shed new light on
the original puzzles.
2 Orthodox Predictions
Orthodox semantic theories treat necessity modals like ‘ought’ and possibility
modals like ‘may’ as universal and existential quantifiers, respectively, over sets
of worlds.4 Where Rpwq is the set of worlds relevant at the world w,5 the or-
thodox theory of ‘ought’ (l) and ‘may’ (♦) roughly amounts to the following,
with JφKw giving the truth value of φ at a world w (for simplicity, I ignore some
syntactic complexity, the dependence of R on context, and semantic interactions
4See Kripke (1963). In Kratzer (1977, 1991), the dominant orthodox theory of natural language
modals, there are several worthwhile complications of the basic quantificational idea, but they do
not matter for our purposes. See Portner (2009) for a textbook presentation of various semantic
theories of natural language modals.
5 In the Kratzerian dialect (Kratzer, 1977, 1991), where modals are relative to a modal base f




where maxgpwq is a function that takes a proposition and returns the subset of worlds that are
maximal with respect to the order determined by g.
In the Kripkean dialect, where modals are sensitive to an accessibility relation R between worlds
in a set W, we define Rpwq as follows:
Rpwq “ tv P W | pw, vq P Ru
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with tense):
JlφKw “ true iff for every w1 P Rpwq : JφKw
1
“ true
J♦φKw “ true iff for some w1 P Rpwq : JφKw
1
“ true
That is, lpφq is true iff φ is true at every relevant world, while ♦pφq is true iff φ is
true at at least one relevant world. As a result, orthodox semantic theories make
modals like ‘ought’ and ‘may’ upward monotonic operators:
For any sentential operator ∆: ∆ is upward monotonic iff whenever φ
entails ψ, ∆pφq entails ∆pψq.
The upward monotonicity property means that in order to speak truly about
what is necessary or possible, one need not be completely specific. For example,
consider ‘ought’. By the orthodox semantics above, ‘Alicia ought to mail the
letter overnight’ is true at w iff every world in Rpwq is one where ‘Alicia mails
the letter overnight’ is true. Since ‘Alicia mails the letter overnight’ entails ‘Alicia
mails the letter’, whenever that latter condition holds, every world in Rpwq will
also be one where ‘Alicia mails the letter’ is true. Thus, the less specific sentence
‘Alicia ought to mail the letter’ is true whenever the more specific sentence ‘Alicia
ought to mail the letter overnight’ is.
By the same token, however, orthodox theories make the counter-intuitive
predictions they do in our two puzzles. Both are a direct result of the fact that a
disjunction φ_ψ is asymmetrically entailed by its disjuncts, φ and ψ. This means
that in general, lφ asymmetrically entails lpφ_ ψq, and ♦φ asymmetrically en-
tails ♦pφ_ ψq:
lφ ( lpφ_ ψq
♦φ ( ♦pφ_ ψq
The Ross inference in (1) is just an instance of this schema. Since ‘Alicia mails the
letter’ entails ‘Alicia either mails the letter or burns it’, orthodox theories predict
that ‘Alicia ought to mail the letter’ entails ‘Alicia ought to either mail the letter
or burn it’ (lM ( lpM_ Bq).
The invalidity of the free choice inference has the same source. Suppose there
is only one relevant world, w. Further, suppose M is true and B is false at w. Then
♦M is true, since w is a relevant world where M is true. Since ♦ is an upward
monotonic operator, it follows that ♦pM _ Bq is automatically true. However,
since every relevant world (i.e., w) makes B false, we also have that ♦B is false.
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This presents a counterexample to the validity of the argument in (2): the premise
♦pM_ Bq is true while the conclusion, ♦B is false. So the free choice inference is
invalid.
3 Range
Before moving on to my analysis of the two puzzles, I want to briefly note their
generality. While they have sometimes been treated as arising only for a special
class of deontic modals like ‘ought’ and ‘may’,6 recent research has made clear that
they arise for a much wider class of modals,7 and are not tied to any particular
‘flavors’ of modality.8 To see this, let us schematize the inferences as follows,
where ∆ is a modal operator:9
(Ross schema) ∆ppq therefore ∆pp_ qq
(Free choice schema) ∆pp_ qq therefore ∆p and ∆q
Consider the following instances of the Ross schema with non-deontic modals:























6The puzzles were discovered in early work on deontic logic and the logic of imperatives (von
Wright, 1968; Kamp, 1973; Ross, 1941). Some recent research has continued this focus on deontic
flavors of modality, including Barker (2010), Cariani (2013), Fusco (2015), and Starr (2016). Of
course, as some of these authors mention, there are likely ways to extend these accounts, tailored
to the deontic case, to other flavors of modality.
7See Zimmermann (2006), Yablo (2014), Abreu Zavaleta (2019) for some examples of invalid,
non-deontic Ross inferences, and Zimmermann (2000); Nickel (2010); Romoli and Santorio (2017);
Willer (2021) for some discussion of valid, non-deontic free choice inferences.
8It is standardly assumed that modal auxiliaries like ‘must’ are context sensitive, and in var-
ious contexts can express different flavors of necessity, such as metaphysical, epistemic, deontic,
and so on.
9Throughout, by ‘modal’ or ‘modal operator’, I mean a sentential operator that is standardly
analyzed as shifting the world of evaluation for its complement proposition. ‘Modal’ as I am
using it thus includes not just modal auxiliaries like ‘must’ and ‘may’, but also attitude verbs like
‘want’ and ‘believe’.
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either stay in motion or come
to absolute rest.
The subject matter in these examples encourages physical, metaphysical, or epis-
temic interpretations of the modals, and yet the inference appears just as invalid
as the one in (1). Similarly, the pattern appears invalid for many attitude verbs,


















to mail the letter.






























that Bulmaro mailed the letter.












that Bulmaro either mailed the letter or burned
it.
Each seems to be a complete non sequitur. See Zimmermann (2006), Yablo (2014),
Abreu Zavaleta (2019) for further discussions of Ross inferences with some of
these verbs.
Similarly, as Zimmermann (2000); Nickel (2010); Romoli and Santorio (2017);
Willer (2021) argue, the free choice pattern appears to be valid for non-deontic
possibility modals. For some examples:
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(6) a. Given their skill, Alicia or Bulmaro
"
might








(7) a. Hydrangeas can grow either pink or blue flowers.
b. So, hydrangeas can grow pink flowers and they can grow blue flowers.
Each inference seems as well-supported as the original in (2), despite the fact that
the modals take on a non-deontic interpretation.
This data suggests that the intuitive status of the two inferences has nothing to
do with a deontic interpretation of the modals involved.10 An adequate account
of the puzzles, therefore, should be general enough to accommodate modals of
any flavor.
4 Independence
As mentioned in the introduction, a speaker’s judgment of the (in)validity of an
argument depends on what meanings the speaker takes the premises and con-
clusion to have. In judging the Ross inference to be invalid, a speaker senses that
lpM _ Bq, for example, intuitively means something that the truth of lM fails
to guarantee. And in judging a free choice inference to be valid, a speaker senses
that ♦pM _ Bq intuitively means something that should guarantee the truth of
both ♦M and ♦B. Thus, a crucial step toward providing a solution to the two
puzzles is to identify what intuitive meanings speakers take sentences of the form
∆pp_ qq to have (I will use ∆ as an variable ranging over possibility and necessity
modals that give rise to either of the puzzles), such that orthodox theories fail to
correctly predict that these sentences have this intuitive meaning.
Both pragmatic and semantic accounts of the puzzles have typically agreed
on this issue.11 They say that over and above its orthodox truth conditions, a
modal claim of the form ∆pp _ qq conveys that each disjunct is compatible with
the relevant set of worlds. That is, they say that the information that ∆pp _ qq
10This is not to claim that there are no modals for which the Ross inference is valid — perhaps
there are. My claim is a weaker one: given these examples, the solution we propose to the puzzles
should be flexible enough to handle any flavor of modality.
11See, for example, von Fintel (2012) for a pragmatic version of this thesis and Simons (2005) for
a semantic one. As I mention below, Menéndez Benito (2005, 2010) has dissented in the analogous
case of free choice ‘any’ under possibility modals, and building on this work, Aloni and Ciardelli
(2013) dissent in the analogous case of imperatives.
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intuitively conveys, and which orthodox theories fail to predict, is underwritten
by what I will call Diversity inferences (where ñ is ambiguous between semantic
entailment, implicature, or some other robust form of licensing):
Diversity Inferences:
lpp_ qq ñ ♦p
ñ ♦q
♦pp_ qq ñ ♦p
ñ ♦q
For modals without lexicalized duals, like ‘want’ and ‘intend’, we can give a
meta-linguistic characterization of the Diversity inferences as follows:
Meta-Linguistic Diversity Inferences:
Where ∆ is a necessity or possibility modal, Rpwq is the set of relevant
worlds associated with the modal ∆ at w, and JpK is the set of worlds
in which p is true:
x∆pp_ qqy is true at w ñ Rpwq X JpK ‰ H
ñ Rpwq X JqK ‰ H
The Diversity inferences, not supported by the orthodox semantics, promise
to explain our intuitive judgments in both puzzles. For free choice, this is trivial:
the inference just is a special case of Diversity. For the Ross inference, the thought
is usually that because of the Diversity inferences, the conclusion lpM_ Bq con-
veys ♦B, and since the premise lM does not guarantee this, the argument is
judged to be invalid.12 I will call the theory that the Diversity inferences capture
the unorthodox content conveyed by modals with disjunctive complements, and
that these inferences explain the gap between the orthodox semantics and our
intuitions about the two puzzles, the ‘Diversity analysis’.
Unfortunately, the Diversity analysis cannot explain all of the relevant data.
In particular, there are two pieces of data it cannot explain: what I will call ex-
tended Ross’s puzzle; and what I will call independence conditional inferences. First,
let me introduce the former. The Diversity analysis says that the argument in (1)
is (or merely appears) invalid because the conclusion entails (or implicates) the
12See, for example, Wedgwood (2006); von Fintel (2012).
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permissibility of the added disjunct — a fact not guaranteed by the truth of the
premise. If that analysis were correct, then adding a premise that explicitly guar-
antees the permissibility of the added disjunct should change whether or not the
argument is judged to be invalid. However, this prediction is not borne out. Even
in cases where both disjuncts are guaranteed to be permissible by the premises,
the inference pattern seems invalid (see Sayre-McCord (1986) and Fusco (2015)
for this point). For example:
Extended Ross’s Puzzle.
(8) a. Alicia ought to mail the letter. lM
b. Alicia may use the phone. ♦P
c. # So, Alicia ought to either mail the letter or use the phone. lpM_ Pq
The conclusion in (8c) does not seem to follow. But the premises guarantee that
the Diversity inferences are supported.13 So the defectiveness of the inference in
(8) cannot be a result of the failure of the Diversity inferences to be licensed by the
premises. Notice that like the original Ross inference, the extended pattern is also
defective for non-deontic modals. For example, consider the case of epistemic
’must’ and ’might’:
(9) a. Alicia must have mailed the letter. lM
b. Alicia might have used the phone. ♦P
c. # So, Alicia must have either mailed the letter or used the phone.
lpM_ Pq
The second type of data that the Diversity analysis cannot explain arises from the
interaction between modals and conditionals.14 As is well known, conditionals
of the form ‘If φ, then ∆pψq’ (where ∆ is a modal) often give rise to ‘restriction’
readings, where the semantic function of the antecedent clause (φ) seems to be
to restrict the domain of worlds relevant for the modal ∆ in the consequent to
the subset of relevant worlds where the antecedent is true (Rpwq X JφK).15 When
13I am making the standard assumption that modals, like other quantifiers, presuppose that
their domains are non-empty. Thus, lM entails that there is a relevant world where M is true.
This means that whenever lM is true, ♦M is also true.
14See also Fusco (2015) for this data in the case of ‘ought’, and an alternative account of it.
15See Kratzer (2012a,b) for the classic theory of this phenomenon in the case of non-attitude
modals, and Blumberg and Holguı́n (2019) for recent work on restriction effects in the case of
attitude verbs.
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modals capable of such restriction have disjunctive complements, their accep-
tance appears to license the inference of what I call independence conditionals:
Independence Conditionals.
(10) a. Alicia ought to either write an essay or give a presentation. lpE_ Pq
b. So, if she doesn’t write an essay, she ought give a presentation.  E Ñ
lP
c. So, if she doesn’t give a presentation, she ought to write an essay.
 P Ñ lE
(11) a. Alicia may either write an essay or give a presentation. ♦pE_ Pq
b. So, if she doesn’t write an essay, she may give a presentation.  E Ñ
♦P
c. So, if she doesn’t give a presentation, she may write an essay. P Ñ ♦E
Given the standard assumption that a necessity modal like ‘ought’ presupposes
that its domain is non-empty, the restriction readings of these conditionals have
the following truth conditions:
(10b) True iff there are some relevant worlds where Alicia doesn’t write an
essay, and in all of these, she gives a presentation (Rpwq X J EK ‰ H and
Rpwq X J EK Ď JPK).
(10c) True iff there are some relevant worlds where Alicia doesn’t give a pre-
sentation, and in all of these, she writes an essay (Rpwq X J EK ‰ H and
Rpwq X J EK Ď JPK).
(11b) True iff in some relevant world where Alicia does not write an essay, she
gives a presentation (pRpwq X J EKq X JPK ‰ H).
(11c) True iff in some relevant world where Alicia does not give a presentation,
she writes an essay (pRpwq X J PKq X JEK ‰ H).
Neither orthodox semantic theories nor the Diversity analysis predicts that (10b-
10c) should follow from (10a) or that (11b-11c) should follow from (11a). To see
this, suppose that (10a) and (11a) are true. Orthodox semantic theories allow
that (10a) and (11a) can be true if there are no relevant B-worlds, or if there
are no relevant M-worlds. In the former case, the conditionals (10b) and (11b)
would be false, while in the latter, (10c) and (11c) would be false. Thus, orthodox
semantic theories do not validate these conditional inferences. But the Diversity
inferences cannot explain their plausibility either. The truth conditions of (10b-
10c) and (11b-11c) require not just that there is some relevant E-world and some
10
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relevant P-world. Rather, (10b) and (11b) each require more specifically that there
is a relevant P-and-not-E-world, and (10c) and (11c) each require that there is a
relevant E-and-not-P-world.16 In other words, these conditionals require that E
and P are independently relevant alternatives, and, I claim, the acceptance of (10a)
and (11a) appears to guarantee this.
Rpwq
JMK JPK
Figure 1: Diversity without Independence: RpwqX JMK ‰ H and RpwqX JPK ‰ H
In fact, this requirement of independent relevance also offers a plausible expla-
nation of what goes wrong in the extended Ross’s puzzle above. The conclusion
(8c) does not merely convey that using the phone is allowed. It conveys that Ali-
cia may fulfill her obligation(s) by using the phone independently of whether she
mails the letter. The premises of (8) do not guarantee this. If (9) is true at w, then
there is some world v in Rpwq where Alicia uses the phone. But given (8a), it
follows that Alicia also mails the letter at v. This situation is illustrated in Figure
1, where the relevant set of worlds, Rpwq, makes the premises (8a) and (9) true.
The problem, according to me, is that while using the phone is permissible, it is
not an independent option on a par with mailing the letter. In fact, the premises
of (8) entail that using the phone is precisely not an independent way for Alicia
to fulfill her obligation(s), for if they are true, Alicia may use the phone only if
she also mails the letter. For using the phone to constitute an independent way
for Alicia’s obligation(s) to be fulfilled, as I am claiming the conclusion in (8c)
requires, there must also be a relevant world where she uses the phone without
mailing the letter. That is just to say the conclusion (8c) requires both ♦pM^ Pq
and ♦pP ^  Mq to be true. In other words, the set of relevant worlds has to
intersect the relative complements of the disjuncts, as illustrated in Figure 2.
16Again, in the case of (10b) and (10c), this assumes that natural language necessity modals
like ‘ought’ presuppose that their domains are non-empty.
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Rpwq
JMK JPK
Figure 2: Independence: Rpwq X JM^ PK ‰ H; Rpwq X JP^ MK ‰ H
The Independence requirement I am proposing has some precedent in Menéndez
Benito (2010), which argues that a similar condition governs the interaction be-
tween possibility modals and free choice ‘any’ (and Spanish ‘cualquiera’).17 Sup-
pose we are playing a card game and before you is the whole suit of diamonds
on one side, and the whole suit of hearts on the other. If the rules of the game
require that you now take one of these suits, then saying ‘You may take any dia-
mond card’ is deeply misleading, as Menéndez Benito argues. For while it is true
that for each diamond card, there is a permissible possibility in which you take
it, the sentence seems to convey the stronger permission to take each diamond
card independently of taking the others.18 We may adapt the example to show
something similar for the interaction between possibility modals and disjunctive
complements. Suppose now that you have only one option: to take the pair con-
sisting of the ace and ten of diamonds. Orthodox semantic treatments of ‘may’
would say that the following sentence is true:
(12) # You may either take the ace or the ten of diamonds.
But (12) seems to misdescribe things. Orthodox semantic theories, by themselves,
do not have the resources to explain why, since taking the pair is a relevant pos-
17I will not discuss free choice ‘any’ in this paper, but I think it will be clear enough how
my account could be extended to that case in order to capture the data Menéndez Benito puts
forward.
See also Aloni and Ciardelli (2013), which applies Menéndez Benito’s insight to the case of
imperatives.
18The term used by Menéndez Benito (2005, 2010)) is not independence but exclusivity. I have
opted for ‘independence’ here since I do not want to suggest any erroneous connections to ‘ex-
clusive’ disjunction.
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sibility, and doing so makes the embedded disjunction true. But the Diversity
analysis cannot explain why (12) is misleading either, since taking the pair in-
volves taking the ace and taking the ten, making each disjunct true. By contrast,
an extension of our analysis of (8) does offer an explanation for why (12) is mis-
leading: the disjuncts do not pick out independent alternatives. Since the only
relevant option is to take the whole pair, you cannot take the ace of diamonds
without taking the ten of diamonds, or vice versa. On my view, then, (12) is infe-
licitous because the alternatives it describes are not independently possible.19
In sum, I argue that both possibility and necessity modals license what I will
call Independence inferences. Accepting ∆pp_ qq disposes us to accept that p and
q are each independent alternatives in the relevant domain of possibilities: i.e.,
that both (i) p-without-q, and (ii) q-without-p are compatible with the relevant
set of worlds. For necessity and possibility modals with lexicalized duals, we
can schematize these inferences as follows:
Independence Inferences:
lpp_ qq ñ ♦pp^ qq
ñ ♦pq^ pq
♦pp_ qq ñ ♦pp^ qq
ñ ♦pq^ pq
For modals without lexicalized duals like ‘want’, or ‘intend’, we can give a meta-
linguistic characterization of Independence as follows:
Meta-Linguistic Independence Inferences:
Where ∆ is a necessity or possibility modal, Rpwq is the set of relevant
worlds associated with the modal ∆ at w, and JpK is the set of worlds
in which p is true:
x∆pp_ qqy is true at w ñ Rpwq X pJpKzJqKq ‰ H
ñ Rpwq X pJqKzJpKq ‰ H
Note that, since ♦pp ^ qq entails ♦p, the Independence inferences are strictly
stronger than the Diversity inferences.
19In fact, on the theory I go on to develop in this paper, (12) will be neither true nor false in the
described situation. I discuss the status of (12) further in §8.
13
Independent Alternatives Richard Booth
Of course, the Independence inferences only make sense if the embedded
disjunction p _ q satisfies ‘Hurford’s constraint’ against redundant disjuncts —
that is, if neither p nor q entails the other (see Hurford (1974) and Gazdar (1979)).
I will assume, following recent work on the topic, that felicitous disjunctions
which appear to flout Hurford’s constraint at the level of surface grammar are
interpreted at the level of logical form via ‘exhaustification’ operators that enforce
conformity to the constraint.20 This means that for the interpreted structures we
are interested in, we may safely assume Hurford’s constraint holds and neither
p-and-not-q nor q-and-not-p are contradictions.
In the rest of this paper, I will provide a positive account of the interactions
between modals and disjunctions that predicts the Independence inferences. Be-
fore moving on to that project, I want to note that it begins with an important
theoretical choice: whether to explain the Independence inferences pragmatically
or semantically. Presenting a conclusive argument in favor of one or the other
strategy would not be possible here. Instead, I will limit myself to noting some
problems that pragmatic accounts face. I think these problems suggest that we
should opt for a semantic account. First, if hearers make the Independence in-
ferences pragmatically (as Wedgwood (2006) and von Fintel (2012) argue for the
Diversity inferences), then it is unclear why Ross inferences should seem so per-
sistently invalid. Pragmatic inferences in general are usually drawn when they
seem plausible. But a pragmatic account of the Independence inferences hypoth-
esizes that when encountering the argument in (1), a hearer draws the Indepen-
dence inferences precisely when they are implausible, given the premise. Indeed,
on a pragmatic account, the hearer is supposed to draw the Independence in-
ferences, sense their implausibility, and rather than withdraw them, mistake a
20For example, take:
(13) Alicia must have either some or all of the ice cream.
The surface grammar of the embedded disjunction, ‘Alicia had either some or all of the ice cream,’
flouts Hurford’s constraint, since having all of the ice cream entails having some of it. This means
that the modal claim (13) could not possibly license both of the Independence inferences, since
one of them would be:
(14) Alicia may have all but not some of the ice cream.
(14) cannot be true, since the embedded conjunction, ‘Alicia has all but not some of the ice cream,’
is a contradiction. The assumption I will make is that in recognizing this, a hearer assigns to (13)
a logical form roughly equivalent to, ‘Alicia must have either merely some, or all of the ice cream”
(where the exhaustification operator merely has the semantic function of denying that Alicia has
all of the ice cream. See Simons (2001), Katzir and Singh (2013), Meyer (2013, 2014), and Ciardelli
and Roelofsen (2017) for recent discussion.
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semantically valid argument for an invalid one.21
Furthermore, recent empirical research on pragmatic approaches to the free
choice inferences suggests they may have some trouble explaining data concern-
ing processing times (Chemla and Bott, 2014) and the interaction between these
inferences, on the one hand, and non-monotonic contexts or presuppositions, on
the other (see Romoli and Santorio (2019); Gotzner et al. (2020)). A semantic
account of the Independence inferences has the potential to do better on all of
these points. For these reasons, the solution to our puzzles that I outline below
will derive the validity of the Independence inferences as part of the semantics
of sentences of the form ∆pp_ qq.
5 Independence and Minimal Covers
Now that we have seen that the Independence inferences are needed to explain
the puzzles, what consequence does this have for the semantics of modals with
embedded disjunctions? First, let us consider necessity modals. Validating the
Independence inferences means that the truth conditions of lpp_ qq will involve
two requirements. First, there is the one that orthodox accounts predict: that
lpp_ qq is true only if p_ q is true in all of the relevant worlds. Second, p and q
must pick out independent alternatives among the relevant set of worlds — that
is, the relative complements of the truth sets of the disjuncts (the set of p-without-
q worlds, the set of q-without-p worlds) must each have a non-empty intersection
with the set of relevant worlds. Together, these two requirements mean that in
order for lpp_ qq to be true, the truth sets of the disjuncts must form a minimal
21An anonymous reviewer suggests that the independence inferences might be computed by
the combination of the Diversity inferences together and an exclusive reading of the embedded
disjunction. On this hypothesis, the Independence inferences would only be licensed in cases
where it is reasonable to suppose that there is no relevant world that makes the conjunction of
the disjuncts true. While I cannot provide a conclusive argument against this hypothesis here,
I think that the apparent invalidity of examples like (8) and (9) provide evidence against it. In
those cases, the premises can be true together, and when they are both true, there is a relevant
world that the conjunction of the disjuncts true — where Alicia mails the letter and uses the
phone. In such a case, it should be natural for speakers to opt for an inclusive reading of the
disjunction embedded in the conclusion, and recognize that it follows on the orthodox semantics
(even supplemented with the Diversity inferences). But both inferences seem just as invalid as
the original (1). This suggests to me that the Independence inferences do not arise only on an
exclusive reading of the disjunction involved, and thus that the Independence inferences are not
computed in the way this hypothesis claims.
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cover of the set of relevant worlds (as illustrated by Figure 2 above).22 A minimal
cover C of a set S is a collection of sets such that (i) their union contains S (they
cover S); and (ii) no proper subset of C is such that its union contains S (they do
so minimally):
C is a cover of S iff S Ď
ď
C
C is a minimal cover of S iff C is a cover of S and
there is no C1 Ă C : C1 is a cover of S
To break this down: the first requirement associated with the truth of lpp_ qq
— that p_ q be true throughout the relevant set of worlds — is equivalent to the
requirement that the truth sets of the disjuncts (tJpK, JqKu) form a cover of the rel-
evant set of worlds. The second requirement — that among the relevant worlds,
there are both p-without-q-worlds and q-without-p-worlds — is equivalent to the
requirement that the cover be a minimal one: neither the truth set of p nor that of
q suffices on its own to cover the set of relevant worlds.
We can also use the notion of a minimal cover to explain what validating
the Independence inferences will mean for the truth conditions for sentences
of the form ♦pp _ qq. First, there is the part that orthodox semantics predict:
since ♦pp _ qq is a possibility claim, its truth requires that there is at least one
relevant world where p _ q is true. Equivalently, the truth sets of the disjuncts
must form a cover of a non-empty subset of relevant worlds. Second, to support
the Independence inferences, the relative complements of the contents of the
disjuncts (the set of p-without-q worlds, the set of q-without-p worlds) must each
have a non-empty intersection with the set of relevant worlds Rpwq. Together,
these requirements mean that the truth sets of the disjuncts must form a minimal
cover of some non-empty subset of relevant worlds. This is illustrated in Figure
22Simons (2005) also uses a covering relation as a helpful way of summarizing the
modal/disjunction interaction. For Simons, modals with disjunctive complements truth condi-
tionally require that the disjuncts form a supercover of the relevant set of worlds. C is a supercover
of S iff it is a cover of S and every member of C has a non-empty intersection with S. Note that ev-
ery minimal cover is a super cover but not vice versa; and that a supercover semantics validates
the Diversity, but not Independence, inferences. See also Nygren (2019), which systematically
explores the logic of a supercover semantics.
At the end of her paper (§6), Simons briefly considers various pragmatic ‘add-on’ requirements
that she thinks may govern the felicity of disjunctions in certain contexts. One of the three re-
quirements she outlines resembles the minimal covering relation I define here. However, she does
not explore this pragmatic constraint in much detail, and clearly does not think, as I argue here,
that it is part of the literal, truth conditional semantics of modals with embedded disjunctions.
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Figure 3: Independence for possibility modals: the shaded region R1 contains
both p-without-q worlds, and q-without-p worlds.
Using the notion of a minimal cover, our target truth conditions for sentences
of the form lpp_ qq and ♦pp_ qq are as follows:
lpp_ qq is true at w iff tJpK, JqKu is a minimal cover of Rpwq
♦pp_ qq is true at w iff there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq such that
tJpK, JqKu is a minimal cover of R1
Since these truth conditions make reference to the semantic values of the
disjuncts of the complement clause, generating these truth conditions composi-
tionally requires that we adopt a framework in which we can recover, from the
semantic value of a disjunction, the semantic values of its disjuncts. The tradi-
tional possible worlds framework, on which the semantic value of a sentence is
simply its truth set, makes this impossible. For example, given a disjunction that
denotes tw1, w2, w3u, there is no way to tell whether it was composed from dis-
juncts denoting tw1, w2u and tw3u, or from disjuncts denoting tw1u and tw2, w3u.
The traditional framework thus ensures that propositional operators like modals
and attitude verbs are blind to the disjunctive structure of their arguments.
Two related frameworks that allow a modal to see the disjunctive structure of
its argument are alternative semantics (Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), Alonso-
Ovalle (2006), Aloni (2007)) and inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli and Roelofsen
(2011) Aloni and Ciardelli (2013), Ciardelli et al. (2018), Ciardelli et al. (2017)).
17
Independent Alternatives Richard Booth
For reasons I leave to a footnote,23 I will use a version of inquisitive semantics.
I will present the model in two stages.24 First, in §6, I will outline a se-
mantics for modals in a fragment of propositional inquisitive semantics, where
propositions consist of alternatives relevant for their truth. This will allow me
to highlight the basics of the interaction between modals and disjunctions, and
show how my semantics accounts for the original two puzzles as well as the data
from §4. Then, I will note in §7 that this implementation of the theory faces two
problems resulting from its interaction with negation: (i) it no longer supports
impossibility and unnecessity distribution inferences over disjunctions (examples
(19) and (20) below); and (ii), it gives up the duality between possibility and ne-
cessity modals. In response to these issues, I extend the account to a bilateral
system, where propositions consist of two kinds of alternatives: those relevant
for their truth and those relevant for their falsity.25
6 Minimal Covering Semantics
I will use a simple formal language to model the semantics I am arguing for,
consisting of atomic formulae p, q, ..., the standard connectives  ,^,_, a possi-
bility and a necessity modal ♦, l, and two special connectives: Ñ, a restrictor
conditional; and !, the issue-cancelling operator of inquisitive semantics.
In standard possible worlds semantics, the semantic value of a sentence, a
classical proposition, is just a set of worlds (or its characteristic function). Inquisi-
tive semantics adds some complexity: an inquisitive proposition is a set of sets of
23One of the key differences between the two frameworks arises in cases when the set of worlds
where ‘q’ is true is a subset of the worlds where ‘p’ is true (JqK Ď JpK). On the traditional possible
worlds analysis of propositions and disjunction, in this case the proposition denoted by ‘p_ q’ is
identical to the one denoted by just ‘p’. In inquisitive semantics, the same is true, the propositions
denoted by ‘p’ and ‘p _ q’ come out the same. But standard versions of alternative semantics
distinguish between these propositions (Roelofsen (2013), Ciardelli et al. (2017)). This means
that alternative semantics, but not inquisitive semantics, gives up the traditional explanation of
Hurford’s constraint in terms of redundancy (Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2017).
24A formal summary of the semantic framework and results is contained in the appendix at
the end of this paper.
25The basic behavior of the connectives in the bilateral approach is formally similar to the
‘radical inquisitive semantics’ of Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2010) and Aher (2012), the dual
update semantics in Willer (2018), the bilateral ‘state-based’ semantics of Aloni (2018), and the
bilateral truthmaker semantics of Yablo (2014) and Fine (2017a,b). While these other theorists
share a similar semantic framework, and some also share an interest in our two puzzles, none
of these accounts offers a theory that supports the Independence inferences we are interested in in
this paper.
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worlds. The semantic value of an atomic formula is the set of all sets that only
include worlds where it is true. In other words, it denotes its truth set, plus all
of the subsets of that set. Let me illustrate with an example of two atomic sen-
tences, p and q. Suppose p is true at w1 and w2, while q is true at w2 and w3.
Then, where rφs is the inquisitive proposition denoted by φ, we have:
rps “ ttw1, w2u, tw1u, tw2u,Hu
rqs “ ttw2, w3u, tw2u, tw3u,Hu
In inquisitive semantics, conjunctions and disjunctions of propositions are
treated just as in traditional possible world semantics: they denote the operations
of set intersection and union. The proposition denoted by p^ q, then, is just the
set containing everything in common between the proposition denoted by p and
the one denoted by q. The proposition denoted by p_ q is just the set containing
everything that is included either in the one denoted by p or the one denoted by
q. As applied to our simple example, we have:
rp^ qs “ rps X rqs “ ttw2u,Hu
rp_ qs “ rps Y rqs “ ttw1, w2u, tw2, w3u, tw1u, tw2u, tw3u,Hu
Two pieces of information made available by inquisitive propositions are impor-
tant for our purposes. The first is the informative content of a sentence φ, written
infopφq. This is just the set of worlds where φ is true, corresponding directly to
the traditional possible worlds proposition associated with φ. We can recover the
informative content of any inquisitive proposition simply by taking the set of all
of the worlds that are members of any element of the proposition (equivalently,
the union of all sets of worlds in the proposition, infopφq “
Ť
rφs). So, to continue
our example, we have:
infoppq “
ď
rps “ tw1, w2u
infopqq “
ď
rqs “ tw2, w3u
infopp^ qq “
ď
rp^ qs “ tw2u
infopp_ qq “
ď
rp_ qs “ tw1, w2, w3u
The second piece of information that the inquisitive semantics framework
makes available is what sets it apart from the traditional possible worlds frame-
work. This is the notion of the alternatives offered by a proposition φ, written
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altpφq. These correspond to the largest sets included in the inquisitive proposition
denoted by a sentence, and will give us what we are after: the ability to recover
from the semantic value of a disjunction the semantic values of each disjunct.26
In our example, for instance, the alternatives offered by p_ q are the largest sets
in rp _ qs, i.e. tw1, w2u and tw2, w3u. By no accident, these sets are identical to
the informative content, or truth sets, of the two disjuncts, p and q:
altpp_ qq “ ttw1, w2u, tw2, w3uu “ tinfoppq, infopqqu
Compare the case of rp^ qs, which has only one largest member, the singleton
containing w2, where both p and q are true. In this basic propositional fragment
of inquisitive semantics, only disjunctions offer multiple alternatives.27 Every
sentence without a disjunction offers only a single alternative, namely, its infor-
mative content (i.e., for non-disjunctive φ, altpφq “ tinfopφqu).
Using the notion of the alternatives offered by a proposition, then, we can
give a semantics for modals that is sensitive to the disjunctive structure of their
complement clauses. We will say that a necessity modal claim of the form lφ is
true at w just in case the alternatives offered by φ form a minimal cover of the
relevant set of worlds, Rpwq. Similarly, a possibility modal claim of the form ♦φ
will be true at w just in case the alternatives offered by φ form a minimal cover
of a non-empty subset R1 of the relevant set of worlds, Rpwq:
lφ is true at w iff altpφq forms a minimal cover of Rpwq
♦φ is true at w iff there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq
such that altpφq forms a minimal cover of R1
These truth conditions, seemingly tailored to the case when φ is a disjunction,
reduce to the orthodox semantics for modals when φ contains no disjunction. Let
me explain why. As mentioned, when φ contains no disjunction, it offers a single
alternative, corresponding to its truth conditions, i.e. altpφq “ tinfoprφsqu. Now,
for a singleton set like tinfoprφsqu to form a minimal cover of a (non-empty) set
26‘Largest sets’ here means the sets in the proposition such that there is no proper superset also
in the proposition. Officially:
altpφq “ ts P rφs | for every t P rφs, if s Ď t then s “ t u
27In richer versions of inquisitive semantics, other expressions like existential quantifiers and
interrogative operators also introduce multiple alternatives.
20
Independent Alternatives Richard Booth
S is just for it to cover S simpliciter, i.e. for S Ď infoprφsq. Thus, for a necessity
modal l, when φ contains no disjunction, it follows that lφ is true at w iff φ is
true at every relevant world, i.e. iff Rpwq Ď infopφq. For possibility modals, when
φ contains no disjunction, ♦φ is true at a world w iff there is a non-empty subset
R1 of relevant worlds such that R1 is a subset of infopφq. In other words, ♦φ is true
iff there is at least one relevant world where φ is true.
In order to discuss the payoffs of my semantics, we must first talk about the
semantics of negation ( ) and the restrictor conditional (Ñ). In basic inquisitive
semantics, the negation  φ of a proposition φ denotes the set of all sets of worlds
that have no overlap with infopφq. To illustrate by way of our running example,
suppose there is just one more world, w4, where both atoms p, q are false. Then
r ps is the set of all sets of worlds that do not overlap with infoppq “ tw1, w2u.
This means we have:
r ps “ ttw3, w4u, tw3u, tw4u,Hu
I will use the conditionalÑ solely to express conditional restriction effects. So
we will say that φ Ñ ψ is true at w iff ψ is true at w when the set of relevant worlds
Rpwq is altered so as to only include worlds where φ is true: Rpwq X infopφq.28
Now let us turn to the results, for which we will suppose that for atomic p, q,
p_ q satisfies Hurford’s constraint, i.e. neither p nor q entails the other.
Independence Inferences. Suppose that either ♦pp _ qq or lpp _ qq is true at
w. Either way, it follows that tinfoppq, infopqqu forms a minimal cover of some
non-empty subset of the relevant worlds, R1 (R1 “ Rpwq in the case of lpp_ qq).
Then there are at least two relevant worlds in R1, call them v, u, such that one
of them, say v, is included in infoppqzinfopqq, while the other, u, is included in
infopqqzinfoppq. Now, ♦pp^ qq is true iff the alternatives offered by p^ q form
a minimal cover of a non-empty subset of relevant worlds. Since p^ q just offers
a single alternative, corresponding to the worlds where it is true, and v is a  q-
world, it follows that tvu is a subset of relevant worlds that is minimally covered
by the alternatives offered by p ^  q, i.e. infopp ^  qq. So ♦pp ^  qq is true.
A similar argument shows that tuu makes the other Independence inference,
♦pq^ pq, true.29
Independence Conditionals. I will spell out just the necessity modal case, but the
28See the dynamic model update conditional in van Ditmarsch et al. (2008), or the appendix of
this paper, for precise versions of such a conditional.
29In our running example, the truth of ♦pp_ qq or lpp_ qq requires that w1, w3 be among the
relevant alternatives.
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extension to possibility modals is straightforward. Assume that lpp_ qq is true.
Then the alternatives offered by p_ q, i.e. tinfoppq, infopqqu, form a minimal cover
of the relevant set of worlds. This means again that every relevant world is either
a p-world or a q-world, and further, that there are at least two relevant worlds,
v P infoppqzinfopqq and u P infopqqzinfoppq. On our semantics for the restrictor
conditional,  p Ñ lq is true iff lq is true when we ignore all relevant worlds
except the not-p worlds. Doing leaves us only with q-and-not-p-worlds like u.
Since all such worlds are in the truth set of q, tinfopqqu forms a minimal cover of
them. Thus, lq is true on the restriction to the  p worlds, so  p Ñ lq is true
on our original assumption. A parallel argument shows  q Ñ lp is true.
Free Choice. The free choice inference is predicted to be valid. Suppose ♦pp_
qq is true. Then the set of alternatives offered by p_ q, namely tinfoppq, infopqqu,
forms a minimal cover of some subset of the relevant worlds. Since the cover
is minimal, it follows that there is at least one relevant p-and-not-q-world, call
it v, and one q-and-not-p-world, call it u. Thus, there is a non-empty subset of
relevant worlds, namely tvu, that is minimally covered by tinfoppqu. So ♦p is
true. Likewise, there is a non-empty subset of relevant worlds, namely tuu, that
is minimally covered by tinfopqqu. So ♦q is true. Thus, the free choice inference is
validated: ♦pp_ qq entails ♦p and ♦q.
Ross Inference. The Ross inference, by contrast, is invalid. Suppose p stands
for ‘Alicia mails the letter’, and further, that lp, ‘Alicia ought to mail the let-
ter’, is true. Then, the alternatives offered by p, namely tinfoppqu, cover the
relevant set of worlds, Rpwq, where Alicia fulfills her obligation. Now, consider
the truth conditions of lpp_ qq, where q is an independent disjunct like, ‘Alicia
burns the letter’. lpp _ qq is true iff the alternatives offered by p _ q, namely
tinfoppq, infopqqu, form a minimal cover of Rpwq. But, they cannot. Since lp is
true, tinfoppqu is a strictly smaller cover of Rpwq. Thus, lpp_ qq is not true, and
the argument is invalid.
Extended Ross’s Puzzle. Suppose lp and ♦q, are true. Because lp is true,
tinfoppqu covers the relevant worlds. And since tinfoppqu is a minimal cover of
the relevant worlds, tinfoppq, infopqqu is not. Thus, the conclusion of the extended
Ross’s puzzle, lpp_ qq, is not true. It does not matter whether q is compatible
with the relevant alternatives; the inference is invalid because q does not pick out
an independent alternative relative to p.
Flexibility. Before turning to some difficulties faced by the present minimal
covering semantics in the next section, I want to note that standard inquisitive
semantics posits the linguistic resources to allow for some flexibility when it
comes to drawing the Independence inferences. Indeed, standard inquisitive
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semantics posits the existence of an ‘issue-cancelling’ operator (denoted by ‘!’),
which has the effect of eliminating the distinction between alternatives in an
inquisitive proposition: any previously distinguished alternatives are collapsed
into a single, undifferentiated one. This operator has been posited to distinguish
between the semantic values of two questions one can ask using a sentence like
‘Does Alicia speak Hindi or Tamil?’:
(15) a. Does Alicia speak Hindi-or-TamilÒ?
b. Does Alicia speak HindiÒ or TamilÓ?
(where Ò/Ó indicate rising/falling intonation. The intended reading of the first
question, (15a), is polar; it can be resolved with Yes (Alicia speaks at least one
of Hindi and Tamil) or No (Alicia speaks neither language). By contrast, the
second question, (15b), is not polar, and the conventional ways to resolve it di-
rectly are to either say that Alicia speaks Hindi, or to say that she speaks Tamil.
In inquisitive semantics, the difference in the conventional resolutions of these
questions is explained by a difference in the alternatives they offer. Most rele-
vant for our purposes, (15b) treats Hindi and Tamil as distinct alternatives, but
(15a) treats Hindi-or-Tamil as a single alternative. In order to generate different
alternatives for sentences with the same surface structure, inquisitive semantics
hypothesizes that the polar question (15a) contains an operator (represented with
‘!’) that erases the distinction between the Hindi and Tamil alternatives. For our
purposes, the semantics of ! is important insofar as it gives rise to the following
identities. For any sentence φ:30
altp!φq “ tinfopφqu
infop!φq “ infopφq
So !φ is true iff φ is, but its proposition always offers a single alternative corre-
sponding to its truth conditions. Above, I explained that for a non-disjunctive
formula φ, my minimal covering semantics assigns orthodox truth conditions to
lφ and ♦φ. Since the ! operator makes even a disjunction offer just a single al-
ternative, the same reasoning extends to arbitrary formulae of the form !φ. Even
when φ contains disjunction, my semantics assigns orthodox truth conditions to
l!φ and ♦!φ.
30The official semantics for the operator is:
r!φs “ ℘pinfopφqq
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With this operator, we can explain how in certain special contexts, the Inde-
pendence inferences may not be licensed. For example, in an epistemology class,
one might hear the following:
(16) a. Given the evidence, Smith must own a Ford.
b. So, given the evidence, Smith must either own a Ford or live in Barcelona.
On my view, the premise of (16) rules out that Smith lives in Barcelona is an in-
dependent alternative relative to his owning a Ford. This would normally ensure
that the conclusion is not true. In order to make the discourse coherent, then, in-
terpreters may insert the issue-cancelling operator (!) just above the disjunction.
When the inference in (16) is heard as acceptable, this is because it is not actually
of the form lp ñ lpp _ qq. Rather, it has the form lp ñ l!pp _ qq. In sup-
port of this hypothesis, notice that just as with the question (15a), a monotonous
intonation seems to encourage acceptability:
(17) a. Given the evidence, Smith must own a Ford.
b. So, given the evidence, Smith must either own-a-Ford-or-live-in-Barcelona.
In contrast, an alternating intonation, as with (15b), makes it harder to accept:
(18) a. Given the evidence, it must be that Smith owns a Ford.
b. # So, Smith must either own a FordÒ or live in BarcelonaÓ.
Note that this form of flexibility is very different from a pragmatic account of
the Independence inferences. On a semantic account like mine, the unorthodox
content captured by the Independence inferences is part of the default, literal
meaning of modals with disjunctive complements, and not drawing these infer-
ences requires special interpretive work.
7 A Bilateral Version
The minimal covering semantics improves upon the orthodox semantics when it
comes to predicting the meanings of unembedded modal claims. But, like some
other semantic accounts of the puzzles, it is thereby worse than the orthodox
semantics at predicting the meanings of modal claims embedded under down-
ward entailing operators like negation.31 By assigning stronger-than-orthodox
truth conditions to a bare disjunctive modal claim (∆pp_ qq), the theory assigns
31For example, as Alonso-Ovalle (2006) shows, the semantics of Simons (2005) suffers these
problems with negation. See Aloni (2018) and Willer (2018) for alternative bilateral solutions to
these problems, and Aloni (2007) for a unilateral response to these issues based on ambiguity.
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weaker-than-orthodox falsity conditions to it, and thus assigns weaker truth con-
ditions to its negation  ∆pp _ qq. In particular, it gives up the validity of the
following two patterns of inference, both of which are validated by the orthodox
semantics:
Impossibility Distribution.
(19) a. Alicia may not mail the letter or burn it.  ♦pM_ Bq
b. So, Alicia may not mail the letter.  ♦M
c. So, Alicia may not burn the letter.  ♦B
Unnecessity Distribution.
(20) a. Alicia doesn’t have to either mail the letter or burn it.  lpM_ Bq
b. So, Alicia doesn’t have to mail the letter.  lM
c. So, Alicia doesn’t have to burn the letter.  lB
A second problem is that the basic minimal covering semantics gives up predict-
ing the duality of possibility and necessity modals. Duality (the truth conditional
equivalence of  lφ and ♦ φ on the one hand, and  ♦φ and l φ on the other)
is one of the fundamental virtues of the orthodox analysis, which derives the
duality of necessity and possibility modals from the duality of the universal and
existential quantifiers. To illustrate where duality fails on the minimal covering
semantics of the previous section, consider the following pair:
Duality.
(21) a. Alicia may not mail the letter or burn it  ♦pM_ Bq
b. Alicia must not mail the letter or burn it l pM_ Bq
Intuitively, these two sentences are equivalent. Orthodox semantic theories pre-
dict as much. The basic minimal covering semantics I have sketched, however,
strengthens the truth conditions of ♦pM_ Bq, weakening the truth conditions of
 ♦pM_ Bq. It says that (21a) is true iff the alternatives offered by M_ B (Alicia’s
mailing the letter, Alicia’s burning the letter) do not form a minimal cover of the
relevant set of worlds. This would hold, for example, in case in all of the rele-
vant worlds, Alicia burns the letter (i.e. if lB were true). Meanwhile, it assigns
orthodox truth conditions to (21b): it is true iff in every relevant world, M and B
are both false (so, e.g., it entails l M and l B). Thus, while the truth of (21b)
prohibits Alicia from burning the letter, the basic minimal covering semantics
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allows (21a) to be true even if Alicia must burn the letter. Clearly, the predicted
truth conditions of (21a) are far too weak.
Fortunately, a natural extension of the semantics solves these problems. The
key is to define the falsity conditions of our sentences independently of their
truth conditions, and to allow for truth value gaps.32 I will use the same lan-
guage as before, but now assign bilateral inquisitive propositions to sentences. These
bilateral inquisitive propositions will be modeled as pairs of regular inquisitive
propositions that have only one member in common: the empty set. To return
to our simple example of four worlds, we now assign to p a positive part of its
bilateral proposition (written rps`), corresponding to the unilateral inquisitive
proposition from before:
rps` “ ttw1, w2u, tw1u, tw2u,Hu
and we define the negative part (written rps´), as the set of worlds where p is
false, plus all of its subsets (corresponding to what was previously the unilateral
value of  p):
rps´ “ ttw3, w4u, tw3u, tw4u,Hu
Extending these principles to our other atomic sentence, q, we have:
rqs` “ ttw2, w3u, tw2u, tw3u,Hu
rqs´ “ ttw1, w4u, tw1u, tw4u,Hu
In order to make use of these negative parts, I will treat negation as an involution
— it swaps the negative part of a proposition for its positive part, and vice versa:
r φs` “ rφs´
r φs´ “ rφs`
I will treat the positive contribution of conjunction and disjunction the same as
before, namely as set intersection and union, respectively:
rφ^ ψs` “ rφs` X rψs`
rφ_ ψs` “ rφs` Y rψs`
32See Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2010), Aloni (2018) and Willer (2018) for other versions of
bilateral inquisitive semantics with similar motivations.
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As for the negative contributions of these connectives, I will, for simplicity, draw
on the De Morgan equivalences. The negative part of a conjunction will be the
union of the negative parts of its conjuncts, and the negative part of a disjunction
will be the intersection of the negative parts of its disjuncts:33
rφ^ ψs´ “ rφs´ Y rψs´
rφ_ ψs´ “ rφs´ X rψs´
I will also extend definitions of the informative content of a sentence, and
the alternatives offered by a sentence, to the bilateral model. Where we used to
have just the positive alternatives offered by a sentence, we now have its posi-
tive (altprφs`q) and negative (altprφs´q) alternatives, defined in the same way as
before. And where we used to have just the positive informative content of a
sentence, we will now have its positive (infoprφs`q) and negative (infoprφs´q) in-
formative contents, which correspond to the sets of worlds where it is true and
false, respectively.
Figure 4 illustrates some simple examples of propositions. In each subfig-
ure, the four circles are worlds corresponding to the classical valuations of the
atomic sentences p, q (with p indicating p is false), and correspond to our infor-
mal model, starting with w1 in the upper right, and w2, w3, w4 moving counter-
clockwise around the square. Solid lines represent positive alternatives, while
dotted lines represent negative alternatives.
Now, let us return to our modals. We define the truth conditions of the modal
propositions as we did previously, though now with the detail that they depend
33It is easy to see that given the semantics of negation, conjunction, and disjunction I outline
here, the semantics predicts that each of the classical De Morgan equivalences holds. Some of
these equivalences are controversial, especially when embedded under modals or conditionals.
The theory I give here thus inherits some of this controversy. For example, it validates Dual
Free Choice: when p and q are atoms that obey Hurford’s constraint,  lpp^ qq ( ♦ p^ ♦ q.
For given duality between l and ♦, r lpp ^ qqs “ r♦ pp ^ qqs. Then, given the De Morgan
equivalences, r♦ pp ^ qqs “ r♦p p _  qqs. Finally, given the validity of free choice, clearly
♦p p_ qq entails ♦ p and ♦ q. The obvious culprit appears to be the De Morgan equivalence
between  pp^ qq and  p_ q, which are not equivalent on the unilateral model of the previous
section or in standard inquisitive semantics. One way to modify the present system in order to
invalidate dual free choice would be to change the rule for the negative part of conjunction, so
that it is not equivalent to a disjunction of negations. Since this issue independent of the original
puzzles and the data adduced in §4, I do not want to take a stand on it here. For simplicity and
completeness, I have opted to validate all of the De Morgan equivalences. For further discussion
of the De Morgan equivalences in modal and conditional contexts, see Fox (2007); Chemla (2009);
Ciardelli et al. (2018); Romoli and Santorio (2019); Marty et al. (ms).
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Figure 4: Examples of bilateral propositions.
on the positive alternatives offered by the proposition:
lφ is true at w iff altprφs`q forms a minimal cover of Rpwq
♦φ is true at w iff there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq
such that altprφs`q forms a minimal cover of R1
Ensuring duality means making  lφ equivalent to ♦ φ, and  ♦φ equivalent
to l φ. Since the negative alternatives of a proposition are identical to the
positive alternatives of its negation (i.e. altprφs´q “ altpr φs`q), duality leads
to the following falsity conditions:
lφ is false at w iff there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq
such that altprφs´q forms a minimal cover of R1
♦φ is false at w iff altprφs´q forms a minimal cover of Rpwq
Duality. Now let me unpack this semantics by showing how it recovers the
truth conditional equivalence of (21a) and (21b). Recall those sentences:
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(21) (21a) Alicia may not mail the letter or burn it  ♦pM_ Bq
(21b) Alicia must not mail the letter or burn it l pM_ Bq
I will show that these sentences are true and false in the same circumstances.
First, truth. By our semantics for negation,  ♦pM_ Bq is true just in case ♦pM_
Bq is false. ♦pM_ Bq is false iff the negative alternatives offered by M_ B form a
minimal cover of the set of relevant worlds. Since the negative alternatives offered
by M _ B are equal to the positive alternatives offered by  pM _ Bq, it follows
that ♦pM_ Bq is false exactly whenever l pM_ Bq is true. Thus,  ♦pM_ Bq is
true iff l pM_ Bq is true.
Now for falsity.  ♦pM_ Bq is false iff ♦pM_ Bq is true, i.e. when the positive
alternatives of M _ B form a minimal cover of a non-empty subset of relevant
worlds. l pM _ Bq, on the other hand, is false iff the negative alternatives of
 pM_ Bq form a minimal cover of a non-empty subset of relevant worlds. Since
the negative alternatives of  pM_ Bq are identical to the positive alternatives of
M_ B, the two sentences are false in exactly the same worlds.
By ensuring duality, we once again predict the validity of impossibility and
unnecessity distribution over disjunction (19)-(20). Consider impossibility distri-
bution, repeated here:
Impossibility Distribution.
(19a) Alicia may not mail the letter or burn it.  ♦pM_ Bq
(19b) So, Alicia may not mail the letter.  ♦M
(19c) So, Alicia may not burn the letter.  ♦B
By Duality, the premise  ♦pM _ Bq is equivalent to l pM _ Bq, which by
the De Morgan laws is equivalent to lp M ^  Bq, which is true just in case
altpr M^ Bs`q “ tinfoprMs´q X infoprBs´qu) is a minimal cover of Rpwq. If that
latter condition holds, then tinfoprMs´qu “ altprMs´q is also a minimal cover of
Rpwq, meaning that ♦pMq is false at w, so  ♦M is true. Similarly for  ♦B.
A similar argument works for unnecessity distribution, repeated here:
Unnecessity Distribution.
(20a) Alicia doesn’t have to either mail the letter or burn it.  lpM_ Bq
(20b) So, Alicia doesn’t have to mail the letter.  lM
(20c) So, Alicia doesn’t have to burn the letter.  lB
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When (20a) is true, lpM _ Bq is false. It follows that the negative alternatives
of M_ B, i.e. the singleton containing all worlds where both M and B are false,
cover a non-empty set of relevant worlds. If that’s the case, then the larger set
of worlds where just M is false also covers that set. The same goes for the larger
set of worlds where just B is false. But then, this means that ♦ M and ♦ B are
true. By Duality, these are equivalent to  lM and  lB.
Moving to this bilateral system thus allows us to regain the orthodox pre-
dictions about the truth conditions of disjunctive modal claims embedded under
negation and other downward entailing operators.
8 Truth Value Gaps
Adopting the bilateral framework I have outlined here requires accepting some
truth value gaps, but I think that they are well placed.34 First, if we assume
atomic formulae are either true or false in every world, then it is only sentences
containing modals that generate truth value gaps. Further, there are no truth
value gluts. So, the bilateral system ensures that the non-modal fragment behaves
classically.
In semantics, truth value gaps are most often taken to indicate presupposition
failure. But other kinds of gaps have been postulated. In particular, predicates
of plurals seem to generate gaps as a result of ‘homogeneity’ effects.35 Consider
the following pair:
(22) a. Alicia and Bulmaro saw the movie. They liked it.
b. Alicia and Bulmaro saw the movie. They did not like it.
The second sentence of (22a) is true iff both Alicia and Bulmaro liked the movie;
while its negation in (22b) is true iff neither Alicia nor Bulmaro liked it. There is
a gap between these truth conditions: if Alicia but not Bulmaro liked the movie,
both (22a) and (22b) seem to misdescribe the situation. On some theories of plural
predication, this is because the second sentence of each example is neither true
nor false in that situation. The truth value gap arises because the predicate ‘liked
it’ expects its plural arguments to be homogeneous with respect to it: either all
or none of the individuals in a collection satisfy it.
34The bilateral, dynamic inquisitive semantics of Willer (2018) also postulates some truth value
gaps for modal sentences.
35See for example, Schwarzschild (1993) and Križ (2015, 2016). It is controversial whether
homogeneity effects give rise to gaps, and if they do, whether these gaps should be thought of as
presuppositions or not.
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For possibility modals, there appears to be a similar kind of truth value gap:
when ♦pp_ qq is true, p and q are both possible (by free choice). When ♦pp_ qq
is false (i.e. when  ♦pp_ qq is true), p and q are both impossible (by impossibility
distribution). If that is correct, then ♦pp_ qq is neither true nor false when only
one of p, q is possible. And this is exactly what my account predicts. In this
respect, my account concurs with Goldstein (2019)’s theory of possibility modals,
which writes homogeneity directly into their semantics. In contrast to Goldstein’s
homogeneity account, my theory posits a second source of truth value gap for
sentences like ♦pp_ qq. On my account, ♦pp_ qq is also neither true nor false in
case p and q are both possible but not independently so: that is, when ♦p and ♦q
are true, but either ♦pp ^ qq or ♦pq ^ pq is not. This second source of truth
value gap helps explain the anomalous status of (12) in the described scenario.
To recall, you are playing a card game, and your only option is to pick up the
pair consisting of the ace and the ten of diamonds. Someone says:
(12) You may either take the ace of diamonds or the ten of diamonds.
(12) seems to misdescribe things — it appears to say that there are at least two
(independent) options. But its negation seems equally off the mark:
(12’) You may not take the ace of diamonds or the ten of diamonds.
My bilateral semantics can explain why both (12) and (12’) seem to misdescribe
things: neither of them are true.
For necessity modals, truth value gaps arise precisely in the cases at issue
in Ross’s puzzle. Suppose ‘Alicia ought to mail the letter’ (lM) is true at w.
The truth of the Ross inference conclusion, ‘Alicia ought to either mail the letter
or burn it’ (lpM _ Bq) requires that M and B are independent alternatives in
the relevant set of worlds. If the Ross premise lM is true, then B is not an
independent alternative, so lpM_Bq is not true. But neither is it false. By duality
and one of the De Morgan equivalences, it is false just in case ♦p M^ Bq is true.
The truth of that latter sentence obviously requires that there are relevant not-M-
worlds. But since lM is true, there are none. My account thus predicts that the
premise does not merely fail to ensure the truth of the conclusion; it ensures the
conclusion is not true.36
If my account is correct in this prediction, then it offers a diplomatic resolu-
tion of the disagreement over Ross’s puzzle between orthodox and revisionary
semantic accounts. Proponents of revisionary semantic accounts have insisted
36This may be why Ross inferences are so strongly repugnant: the premise not only fails to
ensure the truth of the conclusion: it ensures the conclusion is neither true nor false.
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that lM does not entail lpM _ Bq. Defenders of the orthodox semantics sense
that it must, since  lpM_ Bq entails  lM. If these sentences are always true or
false, then at most one of these claims can be correct. But my account rejects this
assumption. In particular, when lM is true, lpM_ Bq is neither true nor false,
so lM does not entail lpM_ Bq, even though  lpM_ Bq entails  lM. Thus,
we may agree with both parties on these points.
9 Conclusion
I have argued that both Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission
should be explained in terms of the licensing of Independence inferences, which
are stronger than the standard Diversity analysis predicts. I have also given a bi-
lateral inquisitive semantics for the interaction between modals and disjunctions
that generates the validity of these inferences, and showed how it can explain the
full range of data adduced in this paper. Of course, there are many related issues
that remain to be investigated: for example, whether similar puzzles for the logic
of conditionals with embedded disjunctions ought to be explained in terms of
(suitably translated) Independence inferences; and whether there is some deeper
computational or philosophical explanation for the semantic interaction between
modals and disjunctions I defend here. These questions will have to be left for
future research.
Appendix: Bilateral Minimal Covering Semantics
Language.
Given a countable set of atomic sentence letters, At, and p P At, wffs are defined
by the following grammar:
p |  φ | φ^ ψ | φ_ ψ | !φ | φ Ñ ψ | ♦φ | lφ
Models.
A model M is a triple M “ pWM, RM, VMq where WM is a set of worlds, RM is
a function from worlds to sets of worlds (RM : W ÞÑ ℘pWq), and VM is a function
from atomic sentences to truth sets (VM : At ÞÑ ℘pWq).
Bilateral Propositions.
A bilateral proposition P in a model M is a pair pP`, P´q of downward-closed
(relative to the subset relation) sets of sets of worlds, such that their intersection
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is the singleton containing the empty set. In other words, where P˝ P tP`, P´u,
and s, t Ď WM:
P˝ Ď ℘pWMq
if s P P˝ and t Ď s ñ t P P˝
P` X P´ “ tHu
Let PM be the set of all bilateral propositions in M.
Information and Alternatives
For P P PM:
infopP`q “
ď
P` (the set of worlds where P is true)
infopP´q “
ď
P´ (the set of worlds where P is false)
altpP`q “ ts P P` |  Dt P P` : t Ą su (the positive alternatives offered by Pq
altpP´q “ ts P P´ |  Dt P P´ : t Ą su (the negative alternatives offered by Pq
Minimal Cover
C is a cover of S iff S Ď
ď
C
C is a minimal cover of S iff C is a cover of S and
there is no C1 Ă C : C1 is a cover of S
Model Update.
The φ-update of an accessibility function RM, written RMæφ, is defined as fol-
lows:
RMæφ “ λw P WM. info`prφsMq X RMpwq
So RMæφ is the function that takes w to the subset of RMpwq where φ is true in
M. We use this notion to define a model update. The φ-update of a model M,
written (Mæφ) is defined:
Mæφ “ pWM, RMæφ, VMq
Semantics.
The proposition denoted by a wff φ in a model M is denoted rφsM “ prφs`M, rφs
´
Mq
(I drop the model subscript for readability except when important). For atomic
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r φs “ prφs´, rφs`q
rφ^ ψs “ prφs` X rψs`, rφs´ Y rψs´q
rφ_ ψs “ prφs` Y rψs`, rφs´ X rψs´q
r!φs “ p℘pinfoprφss`qq,℘pinfoprψs´qqq






rlφs` “ ℘ptw P W | altprφs`q is a minimal cover of Rpwquq
rlφs´ “ ℘ptw P W | there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq such that
altprφs´q is a minimal cover of R1u
r♦φs` “ ℘ptw P W | there is a non-empty R1 Ď Rpwq such that
altprφs`q is a minimal cover of R1uq
r♦φs´ “ ℘ptw P W |altprφs´q is a minimal cover of Rpwquq
Truth and Falsity
A sentence φ is true at a point M, w iff w P infoprφs`Mq.
A sentence φ is false at a point M, w iff w P infoprφs´Mq.
Entailment
A sentence φ entails a sentence ψ in a model M (written φ (M ψ), when the
following condition holds:
φ (M ψ iff info`prφsMq Ď info`prψsMq
Summary of Results.
As mentioned above, since I am using this simple language to model natural
language disjunction, I am interested in how modals interact with disjunctions
that obey Hurford’s constraint. For this reason, I focus on the set of all models
such that for p, q P At, neither entails the other; we will call these admissible.
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Definition (Admissible model). A model M is admissible iff for p, q P At:
VMppq Ę VMpqq
VMpqq Ę VMppq
Let M be the set of all admissible models, and we will say that φ (M ψ iff for
every M PM, φ (M ψ.
Fact (Independence inferences).
lpp_ qq (M ♦pp^ qq
lpp_ qq (M ♦pq^ pq
♦pp_ qq (M ♦pp^ qq
♦pp_ qq (M ♦pq^ pq
Fact (Independence Conditionals).
lpp_ qq (M  p Ñ lq
lpp_ qq (M  q Ñ lp
♦pp_ qq (M  p Ñ ♦q
♦pp_ qq (M  q Ñ ♦p
Fact (Ross Inference).
lp *M lpp_ qq
Fact (Free Choice).
♦pp_ qq (M ♦p
Fact (Modal Duality). For any φ in any model M:
rlφsM “ r ♦ φsM
r♦φsM “ r l φsM
Fact (Impossibility Distribution Over _).
 ♦pp_ qq (M  ♦p
 ♦pp_ qq (M  ♦q
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Fact (Unnecessity Distribution Over _).
 lpp_ qq (M  lp
 lpp_ qq (M  lq
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Križ, M. (2016). Homogeneity, non-maximality, andall. Journal of Semantics 33(3),
493–539.
Marty, P., J. Romoli, Y. Sudo, and R. Breheny (ms.). Negative free choice.
Menéndez Benito, P. (2005). The Grammar of Choice. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
Menéndez Benito, P. (2010). On universal free choice items. Natural Language
Semantics 18(1), 33–64.
Meyer, M.-C. (2013). Ignorance and Grammar. PhD Thesis, MIT.
Meyer, M.-C. (2014). Deriving hurford’s constraint. Proceedings of SALT 24,
577–596.
Nickel, B. (2010). Generically free choice. Linguistics and Philosophy 33(6), 479–512.
Nygren, K. (2019). Supercover semantics for deontic action logic. Journal of Logic,
Language and Information 28(3), 427–458.
39
Independent Alternatives Richard Booth
Partee, B. and M. Rooth (1983). Generalized conjunction and type ambiguity. In
C. S. Rainer Bauerle and A. von Stechow (Eds.), Meaning, Use, and Interpretation
of Language, pp. 361–383.
Portner, P. (2009). Modality. Oxford University Press.
Roelofsen, F. (2013). Algebraic foundations for the semantic treatment of inquis-
itive content. Synthese 190(S1), 1–24.
Romoli, J. and P. Santorio (2017). Probability and implicatures: A unified account
of the scalar effects of disjunction under modals. Semantics and Pragmatics 10(3),
1–61.
Romoli, J. and P. Santorio (2019). Filtering free choice. Semantics and Pragmat-
ics 12(12), 1–27.
Ross, A. (1941). Imperatives and logic. Philosophy of Science 11(1), 30–46.
Sayre-McCord, G. (1986). Deontic logic and the priority of moral theory.
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